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LENDERS' PERCEPTION OF BORROWER
PARTICIPATION IN CROP INSURANCE PROGRAMS
The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 marked the end of
eight years of efforts to design a program whereby agricultural
producers would have available cost effective protection from
natural disasters.
The Act of 1980 contained provisions to make
crop insurance the most attractive form of disaster protection _
for the producers protected, the private industry insurance
marketers, and the taxpayers financing agricultural disaster
programs.
Recent
legislation
requires that
agricultural
producers must purchase Federal Crop Insurance, if available in
their area and for their crop, in order to be eligible for lowinterest disaster loans.

'

In retrospect, the Federal Crop Insurance has not been as
widely accepted by producers as had been hoped. Currently, a low
percentage of qualified acreage is covered by the crop insurance
program, loss ratios (indemnities to premuims) are higher than
desired (as high as 150%), the crop insurance product itself is
complex, and a large number of producers remain uninformed about
recent improvements in the program.
Efforts are being made by
the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, private industry, and
State University personnel to address these concerns.
Of concern to these groups, and directly influencing the
above issues, is a proposal to remove the level of government
subsidy currently in the crop insurance program.
This action,
according to Classen and Gibson, would raise the national average
premium cost per acre from $4.68 in 1986 to $19.83 in the future.
Such a price increase is hypothesized to decrease the cost
effectiveness of the crop insurance program for producers and
lower participation rates.
Several research studies have been completed, and many are
in progress, exploring provisions of the crop insurance program
and its cost effectiveness as a risk reducing mechanism for
agricultural
producers.
Black
set
forth
two
possible
explanations of low participation rates in the crop insurance
program.
First, that producers were unaware of, or did not
comprehend the benefits of, the Federal Crop Insurance program or
any of the recent "improvements".
Second, producers preceived
that the cost of the program (premiums paid) to be greater than
the preceived benefits (indemnities and protection received).
Pflueger
and
Barry recognized that
earlier
studies
implicitly assumed independence between the producer's decision
to participate in the crop insurance program and the financial
organization of his business.
They recognized that lender
perception of the use of risk reducing strategies could affect a
producer's financing costs and thereby influence the decision for
particiaption in crop insurance program.
Pflueger and Barry
found that a borrower participating in a crop insurance program
had the potential of greater credit availability and thereby
improve farm survival and liquidity.
1

Leatham, Richardson, and Mccarl examined the lender welfare
issue of borrower participation in a crop insurance program.
They recognized that crop insurance can potentially reduce
lenders'
risk by reducing the probability of delinquent and
defaulted loans while at the same time depleting a firm's
liquidity and income. From a lender's viewpoint, the decision to
finance the ' operation is contingent on whether crop insurance
will reduce credit risk.
These authors conclude that at
insurance loss ratios (ratio of expected indemnity payments to
expected cost) of less than .58, the probability of firm survival
was 100 percent and the lender was indifferent to the use/nonuse
of crop insurance.
At loss ratios of greater than .58, both
lender and producer preferred the use of crop
insurance.
Leatham, Richardson, and Mccarl conclude that at a loss ratio of
lender which the lender could resolve by adding a small premium
charge to nonusers of crop insurance thereby encouraging the use
of crop insurance.
Pflueger and Barry surveyed lenders' credit response to a
borrower's use of crop insurance and Leatham, Richardson, and
Mccarl examined the lenders' risk exposure by a borrower's use of
crop
insurance.
However,
actual data on lender/borrower
interaction towards the use of crop insurance was still missing.
Skees . has stated that, "More research of the nature conducted by ·
Pflueger and Barry is needed." This study was conducted to
provide . additional information in this area of lender/borrower
interactions and responds to the informational needs suggested.
Objectives
The objective of this study was to provide insight to a crop
insurance
marketing question not previously studied
- the
viewpoint of lenders f ·inancing the premiums for
Federal Crop
Insurance.
The viewpoint of lenders as to the extent of which
their producers were participating in a crop insurance program
could indicate the current and projected levels of participation,
the extent to which lenders regard crop insurance programs as
cost effective risk reducing strategies, and reasons for low
participation.
Thus, a survey of lenders was conducted to
address
the
question of lenders'
reaction
to
borrower
participation in crop insurance programs.
The objectives of the survey were as follows:
1.

To determine how the removal or reduction of the
government subsidy might affect participation in crop
insurancce programs.

2.

To determine lenders' perceptions as to why, and which,
borrowers may not be purchasing crop insurance.
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3.

To
compare lenders' perception of the level of
participation of their borrowers in the multiple peril
crop insurance program with participation in private
hail/fire insurance.

Data Collection
A survey was mailed during January 1987 to the senior
agricultural lending officer at major agricultural
lending
institutions within South Dakota.
Lenders comprising the sample
were affiliated with Farmers Horne Administration (FrnHA), Farm
Credit Services (FCS), and commercial banks. A follow-up letter
and survey were mailed three weeks after the initial survey was
sent. In total, 191 surveys were returned for a response rate of
56%.
Although a survey of producers could have provided
additioanl insight into this question, many producers were
experiencing financial difficulties and their responses as to why
lenders did/did not require crop insurance or finance their
operation in the absence/presence of crop insurance may have
biased.
Also, as Black has stated, many producers may not be
familiar with the crop insurance program.
South Dakota was an excellent place to conduct such a study
due
to the diversity of lender types · and the level
of
particiaption in crop insurance programs.
Banking laws within
South Dakota allow for diversity within the organizational
structure of the banking community:
multi bank holding company,
affiliate branch banking, and independent banks.
(Schmiesing,
et. al).
Also, there is a number of multi peril crop insurance
policies sold every year in South Dakota; 1.6 million acres of
crop land insured for $109 million of protection in 1986.
In
addition, the Cooperative Extension Service, South Dakota State
Unniversity, has released several extension bulletins, lenders
are included on the mailing list, concerning new provisions and
recent improvements in the crop insurance program.
Crop insurance is available to producers either as the multi
peril crop insurance, commonly refered to as Federal Crop
Insurance (Federal Crop Insurance can be offered as either multi
peril insurance or limited peril insurance (hail/fire), but is
most often associated with the multi peril insurance) or as
private hail/fire insurance.
A distinction between the two was
made in the survey with the multi peril insurance being refered
to as Federal Multi Peril Crop Insurance and the limited peril
insurancce refered to as private hail/fire insurance.
Survey Results
In the survey, lenders were asked what percent of their
borrowers, disregarding borrower risk class, currently purchased
some form of crop insurance.
Lenders were also asked what
3

percent of their borrowers were likely to purchase some form of
crop insurance in the advent that the governmental subsidy was
removed from the Federal Crop Insurance program; the possibility
was detailed in the question and a fifty percent increase in
premium rates was assumed.
Lenders were solicited for their
opinion as to why producers may not particpate in the Federal
Crop Insurance program.
An additional component of the survey requested that lenders
categorize their responses by risk class of their borrowers.
It
was assumed that lenders would have no problems classifying their
borrowers as the last two annual survey of lenders conducted by
the Economics Department, South Dakota State University, had used
the
same classifications of borrower risk classes.
This
delineation of responses is necessary to determine which class of
borrowers are purchasing, or are being encouraged to purchase,
crop insurance.
A concern of the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation is that of adverse selection; onlyhigh risk,
low
management ability producers participating in the crop insurance
program.
Table 1. shows the number of survey respondents as well as
the number of survey respondents who provided useable responses
to the crop insurance questionnaire classified by type of lender.
Table
1.
shows that commercial banks were a predominant
proportion of the survey sample.
The percent of useable
responses from each class of lender was very strong.
Table 1.

Survey Respondents by Lender Classification

# of Survey
Respondents

Lender Class
Commercial Banks (Banks)
Farm Credit System (FCS)
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)
Total Respondents (All)

147
13
31
191

# of Useable
Respondents
143
12
31
186

Table 2.
gives the percent of borrowers purchasing the
various types of crop insurance available given the current rates
for multi peril crop insurance and then assuming a fifty percent
increase in the premium rates for multi peril crop insurance.
The numeric values in Table 2.
are the mean responses of the
lenders from the various classifications.
Lenders, as shown by
Table 2., indicated that almost twice the percentage of borrowers
would select private hail/fire insurance as compared to multi
peril insurance.
For every class of lender, the percent of
borrowers not purchasing some form of crop insurance was greater
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than any other category.
Purchasing private hail/fire insurance
was the second most popular selection, and every lender class
indicated that at least a proportion of their borrowers would
purchase both multi peril and private hail/fire insurance.
T-Tests were used to determine the statisitcal significance
of the diffe~ence in the lenders' response as to what percent of
their
borrowers would purchase the various types of crop
insurance.
T-Tests were used for this analysis since for each
type of insurance, the independent variable was double bounded;
the lower bound in each response was zero and the upper bound was
100 percent. More statistically advance algorithms for analyzing
the data were not available.
Alpha levels of 0.05 and 0.1 were
chosen on which to determine the confidence interval.
Table
2.
shows that there exists
a
statistically
significant difference in the mean response of lenders regarding
the percent of their borrowers who would purchase some form of
crop
insurance.
Generally
no statisitically
significant
differences existed in the mean responses of lenders regarding
the purchase of private hail/fire insurance nor the percent of
borrowers who would not purcahse any form of crop insurance. The
inability to show a statistically significant difference is shown
in the table by no asterisks in the difference column.
Thus, from Table 2., it can be concluded that, in the
viewpoirit bf the agiicultural lenders, that the decision to ·
participate in the multi peril crop insurance program is price
sensitive.
When the cost (premiums) of the multi peril crop
insurance is increased, there is a shift away from multi peril
crop insurance towards private hail/fire
insurance.
This
confirms expectations and is consistent with economic theory.
Within the survey, lenders were asked to respond to possible
reasons why borrowers would not be participating in some form of
crop insurance program and especially in the multi peril crop
insurance program.
Lenders were asked to rank by order of
importance the following reasons for producers not purchasing
crop insurance:
(1) producers knowledge of crop insurance
programs;
(2) producers need to cut cash outlays regardless of
risk;
(3) costs (premiums) of crop insurance programs exceeding
the benefits (indemnities); and (4) other reasons that lenders
could list.
By consensus, lenders indicated that the primary
reason producers did not purchase crop insurance was that costs
exceeded the benefits.
Another portion of the survey asked lenders to respond to
whether their institution sold some form of crop insurance.
The
percentage of each lender classification that did sell some form
of crop insurance is given in Table 3.
The presence of the
lenders' institution in the crop insurance market could have an
influence on the percent of their borrowers who did purchase some
form of crop insurance.
It was assumed that lenders who sold
crop insurance would be more knowledgeable about the product and
would relate the benefits of crop insurnce to their borrowers.
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2.

Table

Percent of Borrowers Purchasing Crop Insurance
Classified by Type of Insurance and Lender

FCS

FmHA

Banks

All

**

*

=

Current MPCI
Rates

Insurance
Type

Lender
Type

8.50
30.75
3.75
57.00

1. 73
26.54
.91
70.82

7.55 **
3.36
3.18 **
-14.09 *

MPCI
Hail/Fire
Both
Neither

13.07
33.33
12.04
41. 56

6.36
39.36
12.32
41. 96

6.48 **
-5.63
-0.74
-0.11

MPCI
Hail/Fire
Both
Neither

13.46
25.50
8.69
52.35

7.11
35.13
5.86
51. 90

6.00 **
-8.73 **
3.03 **
-0.21

MPCI
Hail/Fire
Both
Neither

13.03
27.25
8.82
50.90

6.60
35.27
6.67
51. 46

6.19 **
-'7. 3 4 · **
2.39 *
-1.17

Statistically Significant at alpha
Significant at alpha

FCS
FmHA
All

=
=

.05
.10

Percent of Respondents Indicating Presence in Crop Insurance
Sales by Lender and Insurance Type

Lender Type
Banks

Difference

MPCI
Hail/Fire
Both
Neither

= Statistically

Table 3.

50% Higher
MPCI Rates

% Selling MPCI

% Selling Hail/Fire

55.24

73.43

100.00

100.00

0.00

0.00

48.92

63.98
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Lenders were asked to respond to questions concerning the
percentage of their borrowers that they encouraged to purchase
some form of crop insurance.
Lenders responded to questions
concerning encouragement of the purcahse of either multi peril
crop insurance or hail/fire insurance.
No questions were asked
regarding encouragement of both types of insurance.
'
Tables 4.-7. give the percentage of borrowers that lenders
encouraged to purchase some type of crop insurance .
As Table 3 .
indicated that all Farm Credit Services lenders sold both types
of insurance, and that Farmers Home Administration lenders do not
sell any insurance, no deliniation of selling insurance among
these groups is given in Tables 4. and 5.
Tables 6. and 7.
subdivide the responses of lenders from commercial banks and all
lenders
into the categories of selling various types
of
insurance.
Table 6., and consequently Table 7., presents an interesting
finding regarding lenders encouragement of borrowers to purchase
crop
insurance and whether they sell
insurance.
Lenders
affiliated with commercial banks that sell multi peril crop
insurance are less likely to encourage borrowers of superior and
good risk classifications to purchase multi peril crop insurance
than lenders that do not sell multi peril crop insurance.
For
borrowers in less favorable risk classifications, lenders that do
sell multi peril crop insurance are more likely to encourage
their borrowers to purchase multi peril crop insurance than those
that do not sell multi peril crop insurance.
Lenders that sell
hail/fire insurance displayed opposite tendancies.
Lenders affiliated with commercial banks that sell multi
peril crop insurance are more likely to encourage the good, weak
and inferior risk class borrowers to purchase hail/fire insurance
than those that do not sell multi peril crop insurance.
For
those lenders of this class that sell hail/fire insurance, they
encourage fewer of their borrowers in all but the superior risk
class
to
purchase hail/fire insurance.
In every
case,
disregarding whether lenders sell insurance or not, a greater
percentage of the higher risk class of borrowers are encouraged
to purchase some form of crop insurance protection.

Implications and Conclusions
The indications of the survey results are clear and merit
consideration by those associated with the crop
insurance
industry of crop insurance research.
The findings of this
research meet the objectives of the study and indicate three
distinct considerations for crop insurance research now and into
the future.
Future research needs and implications of this
research for other firm level research will be presented at the
end of this section.

7

The three major findings of this research are, first, that
the survey results indicate that lenders believe borrowers are
more apt to purchase hail/fire insurance rather than multi peril
insurance.
This finding must be weighed against the fact that,
according to the American Association of Crop Insurers, the
primary cause of crop yield loss in south Dakota is from drought
(49.8%).
Thus education efforts may be better directed to
helping producers identify the causes of their yield loss, and
strategies or tools that producers can use to manage those
causes.
Additionally,
this
finding implies that a
look
at
restructuring the multi peril crop insurance program may be in
order.
A multi peril insurance program that parrallels the
coverages and costs of existing hail/fire insurance with extended
coverage against other natural disasters available at additional
cost may be more attractive to producers.
Such a program would
strongly impact the actuarial structure of the Federal Crop
Insurance program.
Hail/fire coverage would need be issued at
competitive coverages and costs to producers and then the cost of
additional coverage would need be differentiated by the cause of
loss insured against and the charactertistics of the borrower
and/or his operation.
Steps have already been taken along this
path
with the aspect of Actual Production History
(APH)
provisions of the current crop insurance program.
The second majdr firiding of this study is that, in the view
of the lenders surveyed, borrowers are sensitive to the cost of
multi
peril
crop
insurance.
Should
the
governmental
subsidization be removed from the Federal Crop Insurance program
and thereby raise the cost of insurance to producers, lenders
feel · that statistically significantly fewer borrowers
will
purchase
multi
peril crop insurance with more
borrowers
purchasing hail/fire insurance.
Thus, for a program that is
already concerned with low participation rates, the presence and
level of governmetal subsidization is crucial.
The third major finding of this study is that lenders seem
to feel that crop insurance is not a viable alternative for
producers who are in a strong financial position. Perceptions of
program costs exceeding benefits seem to be a factor as lenders
are only encouraging producers in weaker financial positions to
purchase crop insurance.
The direction and level of lender
encouragement of their borrowers to purchase crop insurance can
be related to the work of Pflueger and Barry in which lenders
were shown to extend more credit to borrowers in weak financial
positions thereby reaffirming that for some borrowers, crop
insurance may be a more viable risk management strategy than that
of self insuring against yield loss.
While this study has taken steps to fill a void in the
research pertaining to crop insurance programs, it has perhaps in
a greater sense pointed to a need for further research along
these lines. Previous research has shown the need to include the
financing
aspect of a producers crop insurance purchasing

8

decision.
This study supports findings of other research by
showing that while lenders may be more willing to finance the
premiums of a crop insurance policy, their willingness may be
directed to those borrowers who can not afford to self insure
against crop yield loss.
Therefore, more research need be done
to determine which risk management strategies borrowers in strong
financial po~ition are most likely to adopt.

'

Another area of further research is the aspect of borrower
risk
classess.
Lenders are differentiating between
their
borrowers; a borrower is not just a borrower.
As lenders
distinguish
between
risk classes of
borrowers,
research
concerning these same producers ought to also distinguish between
them. Such distinction will become more necessary as lenders use
these risk classes not only for loan classifications but also for
loan pricing.
Additionally,
further
research could be done on the
commercial bank aspect presented in this study. If the sample of
commercial bank lenders could be further subsampled into the
various affiliations of the banking orgaizational structure,
further insight into how lenders from different institutions
would be gained.
Also,
the aspect of moral hazard needs to be
examined more closely in light of these research findings.
Are
participants in crop insurance programs in just poor financial
position, or are they also poor managers? The need for research
in · the area of producer ri~k · management strategi~s continues· to
exist and crop insurance research remains an integral portion of
the risk research area.
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Table

Table

4.

Percent of FmHA Lenders
Purchase Crop Insurance
Borrower Classifications

Encouraging Borrowers to
by Type of Insurance and

Borrower
Classification

% Encouraging

Superior

64.52

54.84

Good

64.52

58.06

Average

77.42

70.97

Weak

77.42

74.19

Inferior

77.42

70.97

5.

%

MPCI

Percent of FCS Lenders
Purchase Crop Insurance
Borrower Classifications

Ecouraging
Hail/Fire

Encouraging Borrowers to
by Type of Insurance and

MPCI

Ecouraging
Hail/Fire

Superior

0.00

0.00

Good

0.00

0.00

Average

15.38

23.08

Weak

61. 54

84.62

Inferior

69.23

84.62

Borrower
Classification

% Encouraging

10

%

f

Table

6.

Percent of Commercial Bank Lenders Encouraging
Borrowers to Purchase Crop Insurance by Type of
Insurance and Borrower and Lender Classification

Multi Peril Insurance
Borrower
Classification

Do Sell

Do Not Sell

Hail/Fire Insurance
Do Sell

Do Not Sell

Percent of Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to Purchase MPCI

'

Superior

3.80

6.25

2.86

0.00

Good

13.92

14.06

10.48

0.00

Average

37.98

31. 25

30.47

100.00

Weak

59.49

42.19

47.62

100.00

Inferior

60.76

43.75

50.48

100.00

Percent of Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to Purchase Hail/Fire
Superior

7.59

10.94

8.57

0.00

Good

16.46

14.06

15.24

100.00

Average

41. 77

42.19

40.00

100.00

Weak

63.29

54.69

58.10

100.00

Inferior

64.56

53.13

60.00

100.00
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Table

7.

Percent of All Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to
Purchase Crop Insurance by Type of Insurance and
Borrower and Lender Classification

Multi Peril Insurance
Borrower
Classification

Do Sell

Do Not Sell

Hail/Fire Insurance
Do Sell

Do Not Sell

Percent of Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to Purchase MPCI
Superior

3.30

24.21

3.36

32.84

Good

12.09

29.47

10.08

40.30

Average

35.17

45.26

29.41

59.70

Weak

60.44

52.63

49.58

68.66

Inferior

62.44

53.68

52.94

67.16

Percent of Lenders Encouraging Borrowers to Purchase Hail/Fire
Superior

6.59

25.26

8.40

29.85

Good

14.29

28.42

14.29

34.33

Average

39.65

51. 58

38.66

58.21

Weak

67.03

61. 05

61. 34

68.66

Inferior

68.13

58.95

62.18

65.67
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